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Australians Get Their First Taste of New Zealand Apples in Ninety Years
By Meredith Kolsky Lewis

Introduction
The Australian government has finally
ended a hotly-contested ninety-year ban
on imports of apples from New Zealand—
a move dictated by the reports in the
WTO dispute (Australia - Measures
Affecting the Importation of Apples from
New Zealand (“Australia–Apples”)).[1] In
its report, the Appellate Body (“AB”)
clarified the sensitive issue of how WTO dispute settlement panels should balance
deference and thoroughness in reviewing governments’ risk assessments.
The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”) requires
WTO members to perform risk assessments whenever they introduce sanitary or
phytosanitary (“SPS”) measures. In WTO disputes over SPS measures, the adequacy of
the risk assessment is usually a central issue. The standard of review is a pivotal concern
in applying the SPS Agreement to government actions. An overly deferential standard may
let members engage in protectionism under the guise of safety—but an overly strict
standard could lead WTO panels and the AB to substitute their own judgment for what
should be decisions left to domestic policymakers.
Background
Australia banned apple imports from New Zealand beginning in 1921, following a
determination in 1919 that fire blight (a plant disease) had become established in New
Zealand.[2] New Zealand and Australia have historically had a strong and dispute-free
trading relationship, entering into the comprehensive Australia New Zealand Closer
Economic Agreement in 1983. Nonetheless, New Zealand’s repeated requests to export
apples between 1986 and 1995 were all rejected.[3] In 1999, New Zealand again applied for
access to the Australian apple market, and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection
Service (“AQIS”) initiated an import risk analysis (“IRA”) in February 1999.[4] In the seven
years that followed, Biosecurity Australia was separated from AQIS; it issued three draft risk
assessments;[5] and the AB also issued its report in the Japan–Measures Affecting the
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Importation of Apples case (which also addressed SPS measures designed to prevent the
entry, establishment, or spread of fire blight—in that instance from United States apples).[6]
In November 2006, Biosecurity Australia issued its final IRA, which recommended a series
of risk management measures directed at fire blight and other plant diseases and pests.[7]
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In March 2007, Australia’s Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine determined that import
permits for New Zealand apples could be issued subject to, inter alia, the application of the
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SPS measures identified in the final IRA.[8] The IRA required quarantine measures similar
to those struck down in the earlier U.S.-Japan dispute. This was the last straw for New
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Zealand, which finally initiated its first WTO or GATT dispute against Australia.[9]
Although New Zealand and Australia are relatively close geographically, their climatic
conditions and apple industries differ. New Zealand currently exports sixty percent of its
apple crop to over seventy countries,[10] but Australia grows apples primarily for its
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domestic market; only about three percent of the industry’s revenue comes from
exports.[11]
One might wonder why Australia fought this issue so hard, and why New Zealand chose to
challenge its closest ally over this particular issue. The amount of trade at stake is small.
The New Zealand industry forecasts apple exports to Australia could grow to NZ $21.7
million/year (US $18 million, or five percent of its total apple exports). But when deciding
whether to bring WTO disputes, New Zealand considers both immediate market access
needs and broader systemic implications, including New Zealand’s interest as a major
agricultural exporter, in ensuring SPS measures are not a disguised form of protectionism.
Meanwhile, the issue became enormously politicized within Australia, whose apple industry
had been entirely protected from foreign competition until late 2010 when Australia imported
Chinese apples for the first time. While many government officials privately admitted the
import ban was unjustified, strong pressure from the domestic industry meant that an
external mandate, such as an adverse WTO ruling, would be necessary to effect change.
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Many predicted an easy win for New Zealand because of the similarity to the Japan–Apples
dispute in which the AB found no scientific evidence that fire blight could be spread by
mature, symptomless apples (the product New Zealand sought to export to Australia). Yet
there were two reasons for caution. First, Australia’s measures related also to another
disease, European Canker, and to a pest—apple leafcurling midge. Second, since the
Japan–Apples case, the AB had taken a more deferential view of the standard of review for
risk assessments conducted under the SPS Agreement—and Australia had proposed an
interpretation that would have shielded from scrutiny much of its risk assessment process.
New Zealand challenged seventeen of Australia’s proposed quarantine measures (eight for
fire blight; five for European Canker; one for apple leafcurling midge; and three general
measures applying to all pests examined in the IRA).[12] Broadly agreeing with New
Zealand, the panel found the specific quarantine measures and the general measures
violated Articles 5.1 and 5.2 (and consequently Article 2.2) of the SPS Agreement; it also
agreed with New Zealand’s claim under Article 5.6 relating to the specific measures
regarding fire blight, European canker, and apple leafcurling midge.[13]
After Australia appealed, the AB upheld the findings on the Articles 5.1, 5.2, and 2.2 issues,
but reversed part of the panel’s analysis under Article 5.6.[14]
The Appellate Body Report
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The AB report is of particular interest because the AB clarified the rulings it made in
Canada/United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones Dispute
(“U.S./Canada–Continued Suspension”) on the standard of review for panels determining
whether a measure is consistent with Article 5.1. The remainder of this Insight focuses on
this issue.[15]
Standard of Review under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement
Article 5.1 provides that in conducting a risk assessment, “Members shall take into account
available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant
inspection, sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests;
existence of pest- or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions;
and quarantine or other treatment.”[16] Thus a risk assessment requires a connection
between scientific evidence and the measure applied. This seemingly simple requirement
has been the subject of much discussion and debate. As noted above, the method of
scrutinizing the relationship between the measure and the available science can lead to
overly intrusive results if too stringent, but unfettered protectionism if too lenient.
In U.S./Canada–Continued Suspension, the AB laid out the standard of review for reviewing
domestic risk assessments pursuant to Article 5.1,[17] stating: “the review power of a panel
is not to determine whether the risk assessment undertaken by a WTO Member is correct,
but rather to determine whether that risk assessment is supported by coherent reasoning
and respectable scientific evidence and is, in this sense, objectively justifiable.”[18] In
addition, “[a] panel should also assess whether the reasoning articulated on the basis of the
scientific evidence is objective and coherent.”[19] Australia argued that this interpretation
meant that the panel could not apply the standard of objectivity and coherence to the quality
of the reasoning found in the IRA’s interim determinations, only to the ultimate conclusions
reached in the IRA.”[20]
The AB began by restating its findings in U.S./Canada–Continued Suspension that a panel
has two primary tasks in reviewing a risk assessment pursuant to Article 5.1:
(i) a determination that the scientific basis of the risk
assessment comes from a respected and qualified source and
can accordingly be considered “legitimate science” according to
the standards of the relevant scientific community; and (ii) a
determination that the reasoning of the risk assessor is objective
and coherent and that, therefore, its conclusions find sufficient
support in the underlying scientific basis.[21]
The AB also emphasized that this analysis “is centred on the notion that the risk
assessment should be evaluated in the light of the scientific evidence on which it relies.”[22]
The panel’s determination of the scientific basis for the risk assessment was not appealed.
Accordingly, the AB focused on the second element of this test, and in particular whether
the panel erred in scrutinizing the IRA’s intermediate reasoning and findings for objectivity
and coherence. The AB rejected Australia’s argument that the panel should only have
reviewed whether the IRA’s intermediate conclusions fell “within a range considered
legitimate by the scientific community.” It noted that Australia was effectively arguing that
panels should use the same methodology to evaluate both the scientific evidence used and
the reasoning and conclusions of the risk assessor.
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The AB referred to its statement in U.S./Canada–Continued Suspension that “a panel is not
well suited to conduct scientific research and assessments itself, and should not substitute
its judgement for that of a risk assessor.”[23] It noted that
whether the requisite rational or objective relationship exists can
only be ascertained through the examination of how the
scientific evidence is used and relied upon to reach particular
conclusions. In this respect, the reasoning employed by the risk
assessor plays an important role in revealing whether or not
such a relationship exists.[24]
The AB further rejected the suggestion that this formulation only applies to final conclusions
of the risk assessor, stating that
it is not possible to review the ultimate conclusions reached by
the risk assessor in isolation from the reasoning and the
intermediate conclusions that lead up to them. A panel needs to
understand how certain conclusions were reached and their
relationship with the underlying scientific basis in order to be in
a position to assess whether the requisite objective and rational
relationships between the science, the risk assessment, and the
resulting SPS measures exist.[25]
This was particularly the case here, where the IRA contained numerous intermediate
findings and conclusions, and where the ultimate conclusions were not accompanied by
separate reasoning.[26]
The AB’s Article 5.1 analysis suggests less deference than some commentators read into
the U.S./Canada–Continued Suspension report. Although the AB did not revisit the
standard of review to be applied in determining whether the scientific basis for the risk
assessment is “legitimate science,” the report implies deference is due in this context
because panels are “not well suited to conduct[ing] scientific research.”[27] With respect to
the panel’s determination of whether the reasoning of a risk assessor is objective and
coherent, however, the AB’s decision seems to indicate that panels must undertake a fairly
detailed review of many aspects of the risk assessor’s decision-making, in particular by
scrutinizing the logic and reasoning used throughout the risk assessment process. Thus,
the AB appears to be applying a higher degree of deference when scrutinizing the scientific
basis for the risk assessment than to the determination of whether the reasoning of the risk
assessor is objective and coherent.
Conclusion
The AB’s guidance on the standard of review clarifies that the deference expressed in
U.S./Canada–Continued Suspension is predicated on a panel’s need to review scientific
evidence—because this is not the panel’s area of expertise—and on the fact that a panel is
reviewing decisions of Members’ authorities.[28] However, it also suggested that a panel
should undertake a detailed review and assessment of the authorities’ logic and reasoning.
Thus, the AB appears to have signaled that its U.S./Canada–Continued Suspension
formulation should neither be interpreted too broadly nor out of context.
Postscript
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Following the AB’s report, the parties agreed on a compliance deadline of August 17,
2011.[29] Biosecurity Australia subsequently reviewed its quarantine policy[30] and released
final measures on August 17 establishing quarantine requirements for New Zealand apple
imports, [31] and initial small shipments of New Zealand apples have arrived in Australia.
More significant volumes of New Zealand apples will not be exported until April, following
the next harvest. The dispute may not be over, however. At the September 2 meeting of
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, New Zealand indicated that Australia’s requirements
are excessive and therefore “questioned whether Australia had fully complied with the DSB
ruling.”[32] While New Zealand appears willing for now to accede to Australia’s
requirements, it expressed further concern about a proposed Private Members Bill in
Australia to prevent New Zealand apple imports and about statements from some
Australian states that they would refuse to allow entry of New Zealand apples.[33] It remains
to be seen whether the federal government can successfully quell these opposition efforts.
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